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EVOLUTION  WITH  STATE-DEPENDENT  MUTATIONS 
BY  JAMES BERGIN AND BARTON L.  LIPMAN  1 
Recent  evolutionary  models  have  introduced  "small  mutation  rates"  as  a  way  of 
refining predictions of long-run behavior. We show that this refinement effect can only be 
obtained  by restrictions on  how  the  magnitude of  the  effect  of  mutation on  evolution 
varies  across  states  of  the  system.  In  particular, given  any  model  of  the  effect  of 
mutations, any invariant distribution of the "mutationless" process is close to an invariant 
distribution of the process with appropriately chosen small mutation rates. 
KEYWORDS:  Evolution, mutation, limiting distributions. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A  RECENT  REFORMULATION  of some  simple evolutionary dynamics has led to a 
surprising result: the addition of small mutation rates leads to precise long-run 
predictions.  We  re-examine  the  robustness  of  this  result with  respect  to  the 
nature  of  the  mutation  process  and show that  this  precision  of  prediction  is 
possible only with very strong assumptions on the mutation process. 
Consider the evolution of strategic behavior in a finite population of individu- 
als who are repeatedly matched to play some finite normal form game. A variety 
of  evolutionary processes  have been  analyzed, but to  fix ideas,  suppose  these 
individuals only  change  their  actions  occasionally,  always changing to  a  best 
response  to  the  current distribution of  strategies in the  population. Clearly, if 
the  initial  distribution of  strategies in the  population  is sufficiently close  to  a 
strict  Nash  equilibrium,2 the  distribution  of  strategies  will  converge  to  this 
equilibrium and stay there forever. Hence  any strict Nash equilibrium is a limit 
point  of  such  a  process,  so  these  dynamics have  at  least  as  many possible 
long-run predictions  as  there  are  strict Nash  equilibria for  the  game.  Many 
evolutionary processes will have still other long-run possibilities, such as cycling 
forever. 
1 We  thank  Nabil  Al-Najjar,  Larry Blume,  Richard  Boylan,  George  Mailath,  J.-F.  Mertens, 
Bernard  de  Meyer,  Yaw  Nyarko,  Phil  Reny,  Jeroen  Swinkels, seminar  participants at  Arizona, 
Columbia, Dublin Economics  Workshop, Northwestern, Penn, Queen's,  Rochester,  Summer in Tel 
Aviv 1994, UCLA, University of Western Ontario, Windsor, the Midwest Mathematical Economics 
Society Meetings,  and the  1994 NBER/CEME  Decentralization  Conference,  and a co-editor and 
three  anonymous referees  for helpful comments. Both  authors also acknowledge financial support 
from the  Social Sciences  and Humanities  Research  Council of  Canada. Bergin thanks UCD  and 
CORE  and Lipman thanks Penn for enjoyable visits during which some of this research was done. 
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That  is,  a  Nash  equilibrium  where  each  player's  strategy  is  the  unique  best  reply  to  his 
opponents. 
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Kandori, Mailath,  and  Rob  (1993)  (henceforth  KMR)  and Young  (1993a)3 
reanalyzed such processes,  showing that the  addition of  small probabilities of 
mutations change the picture significantly. Suppose that there is a small proba- 
bility e >  0 that a given agent "mutates"-that  is, with probability 8,  he deviates 
in  some  fashion  from  the  dynamic  described  above.  (We  comment  on  the 
interpretation of this below.) If every action can be "mutated to," we obtain a 
Markov process which has a strictly positive probability of moving from any state 
to  any other.  Since  every such process  has  a unique  invariant distribution to 
which the system converges from any starting point, the  addition of mutations 
makes the  limit of the process unique (as a function of  8)!  KMR and Young 
consider a sequence of  8's  converging to zero and analyze the limit point of the 
associated sequence of invariant distributions, which they call a long-run  equilib- 
rium. They  and  many  others  have  provided characterizations of  this  unique 
long-run equilibrium for various classes of games. 
Given the dramatic impact of adding mutations, one  naturally wonders what 
mutations are supposed to  represent. The most common answer in the  litera- 
ture,  experimentation,  is  difficult to  reconcile  with  the  assumption  that  the 
mutation  rate  is  constant  across  states,  across  agents,  and  over  time.  Surely 
agents experiment less in states with high payoffs or when they have a great deal 
of experience. 
Of course, if this restriction is not important to the results, there is no need to 
provide a model of what mutations are. We explore the implications of letting 
mutation rates vary with the state of the system, but do not allow time varying 
rates. Within this seemingly slight generalization of KMR/Young,  we show that 
given  any  long-run  prediction  from  the  system  without  mutations  and  any 
model of the way mutations affect evolution, it is always possible to find small 
mutation rates  such that the  long-run behavior of  the  system with mutations 
is arbitrarily close  to  the  given prediction without mutations. In other words, 
any refinement  effect  from  adding mutations  is  solely  due  to  restrictions on 
how  mutation  rates  vary across  states.  This  result  highlights the  importance 
of  developing  models  or  other  criteria  to  determine  "reasonable"  mutation 
processes. 
The  intuition  for this result is  simple. KMR consider games with two pure 
strategy equilibria and hence two states into which the system could settle in the 
long-run in the absence of mutations. In KMR/Young,  the long-run behavior of 
the system with mutations is determined by the number of mutations it takes to 
force the system from one  of these  states to the other. The one which is more 
easily  disrupted  by  mutations  in  this  sense  is  given  zero  probability as  the 
mutation  rate  goes  to  zero.  Here,  though,  the  mutation  rates  could  differ in 
these two states. So even though one state may be more robust than the other in 
3See  also Blume (1993, 1995), Canning (1992), Ellison (1993), Kandori and Rob (1992), Lagunoff 
and  Matsui  (1994),  Noldeke  and  Samuelson  (1993),  Robson  (1994),  Robson  and  Vega-Redondo 
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terms  of  the  number  of  mutations,  it  may  be  less  robust  in  terms  of  the 
probability of these mutations, which is, of course, the crucial factor. 
Because  this reasoning quickly becomes  complex as the  number of long-run 
(absorbing)  states  increases,  we  do  not  exploit  this  intuition  directly.  Our 
approach enables us to provide a simple yet comprehensive analysis, treating the 
way mutations affect evolution very generally and allowing for any of the various 
ways mutations are added in the literature. It also enables us to highlight where 
further research  is  needed.  The  fact  that  our  theorem  holds  for  almost  any 
formulation of how mutations affect evolution means that the qualitative prop- 
erties  of the  effect  of mutation is irrelevant to  the  refinement effect  of KMR 
and Young.  Instead, it is their implicit requirement that the  magnitude of the 
effect of mutation-that  is, the mutation rate-does  not vary "too much" across 
states  which  is  crucial. More  precisely,  the  key  is  their  requirement  that  all 
mutation  rates  converge  to  zero  at  the  same  rate.  Hence  to  generate  more 
precise predictions, we must generate economically interesting conditions on the 
mutation rates. 
There are several reasons why mutation rates may vary with the state of the 
system.  As  noted,  if  mutation  is  intended  to  represent  experimentation  as 
suggested in much of the literature, it is only natural to allow experimentation 
rates to vary with the payoffs being earned by and the experience of the players, 
both of which vary across states. If mutations are interpreted as computational 
error, it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  players  are  more  likely  to  make 
computational errors in more complex situations. Similarly, traditional formula- 
tions of trembles (Selten (1975) and Myerson (1978)) allow tremble rates to vary 
across  information  sets.  Also,  if  the  underlying  mutationless  dynamics  are 
"stronger" in  some  states  than  others  (perhaps  because  movements  in  the 
direction of best  replies  are more obvious or more rewarding in some  states), 
then the effective mutation rates may differ across states. 
Because we wish to show that it is only through restrictions on the mutation 
rates that adding mutations can refine predictions, we impose as few restrictions 
a priori as possible. In particular, we allow mutation rates for different states to 
converge to  zero  at different  rates. As  mentioned  above, these  differences  in 
convergence  rates  are  important  to  the  result.  If  our  only  change  to  the 
KMR/Young  framework were  to write the  mutation  rate for state  i  as some 
fixed constant  ai  times  a "system wide" mutation rate which is taken to zero, 
then  the  analysis in KMR and Young would be  essentially unaffected,4 as we 
explain in more detail later. 
There are many views one can take on this aspect of our modeling. One view 
is  that  sequences  of  mutation  rate  vectors  with  equal  mutation  rates  across 
states  are  "nongeneric"  and hence  unlikely  to  emerge  from  a  robust model. 
Another  is that the  argument Myerson gave for properness applies with equal 
strength here, so that costlier mutations should have probabilities going to zero 
relative  to  the  probability of  less  costly  mutations.  Yet  another  argument in 
4More  precisely, the support of the limiting distribution would be independent of the  ai's. 946  J.  BERGIN  AND  B.  L.  LIPMAN 
favor of state-dependent  and time-varying  mutation rates is the fact that in 
standard  Bayesian  learning  models,  different  errors  go to zero at different  rates 
over time.5  Alternatively,  one might maintain that mutation should be "pure 
noise," suggesting  that all mutation  rates should  be the same. 
Our  view is that in the absence  of a concrete  model of what  mutations  are and 
why they arise, one cannot reject any of these arguments.  Our purpose is to 
show that the "model-less"  approach  to mutation  cannot be justified  and hence 
to motivate further research on these questions. In other words, determining 
what mutation rates are reasonable is not necessary for our result to be of 
interest. To  the  contrary, it  is  the  result that  makes this  determination 
interesting. 
In Section 2.1, we give an example  to illustrate  our results.  In Section 2.2, we 
present the general model. Our main result is stated and proved in Section 3. 
We conclude  in Section 4. 
2. THE  MODEL  AND  MOTIVATING EXAMPLES 
2.1.  Examples 
The insight  of KMR  and Young,  following  on Foster and Young  (1990),  is that 
adding small probabilities  of mutation to an otherwise standard  evolutionary 
process can yield a unique long-run  prediction.  To see this more concretely, 
consider  the following  game: 
1  2 
1(8,8  0,4  e 
2  4,0  6,6J 
Suppose N  agents play this game. In each period, each player must choose a 
single action  which  he uses when playing  against  each of the other N -  1 agents. 
Suppose  the action chosen is a best reply  given the actions chosen by the other 
players  in the previous  period. 
It is not hard  to see that the number  of agents  playing  each strategy  in a given 
period completely determines the future evolution of  the strategies chosen. 
Hence we can represent  this evolutionary  dynamic  as a Markov  process with a 
state space given by the  number of  agents playing, say, strategy 2.  So let 
S =  {0,1,...,  N}.  It is easy to calculate the transition  matrix P  describing  how 
the system moves between states. Letting pij denote the probability  of moving 
from state i  one period to state j  the next, there is an integer i* such that 
Pio =  1 if i <i*,  PiN =  1 if i > i*, and Pi*,N-i*  =  1.6  Intuitively,  if few agents  play 
strategy  2, then all switch  to strategy  1, while if many  play strategy  2, all switch 
to 2. 
An invariant distribution  is  a probability  distribution  on  S,  say q, which 
satisfies q = qP. Such a distribution  may be viewed as a "steady  state" for the 
5See  Blume  (1995)  for analysis  of time-varying  mutation  rates. 
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population.  For this process, the set of invariant  distributions  is {q I  q =  08o  + 
(1  -  0)8N1,  where 8i is a probability  distribution  S putting  probability  1 on state 
i. Note that the invariant  distributions  correspond  to probability  distributions 
over states 0 and N-that  is, over the two strict Nash equilibria. 
Now let us introduce  mutations.  KMR, Young, and others assume that the 
probability  of a mutation  is some fixed e, independent  of time, the current  state, 
or the agent. If an agent does not mutate,  he changes  strategy  or not according 
to the dynamic  described  above. If he does mutate, he changes strategies  with 
some fixed  probability.  For simplicity,  we assume that a mutating  agent chooses 
the opposite strategy  from what the dynamic  without mutations  would specify. 
Mutations  are independent  events across  agents and over time. It is not difficult 
to calculate  the implied  transition  probabilities  as a function  of e. One can use 
these and Lemma 1 of KMR to show that the unique distribution,  say q*= 
(q*,*  , q*),  has lim,5  0q* = 1. 
Suppose  we relax  these assumptions  by letting the mutation  rate vary  with the 
state. If mutation  is intended  to model experimentation  by the players,  then it is 
difficult to  see why the mutation rate in state 0 would be  as large as the 
mutation  rate in other states. In state 0, all agents play strategy 1 and so all 
always earn the highest possible payoff in the game. So why would players 
experiment  in this state? By contrast, in state N, players may experiment  in 
hopes of reaching  the other (Pareto preferred)  Nash equilibrium.  While we do 
not  wish to  claim that this  is  a  necessary property of  mutation rates, a 
reasonable  model of mutations  would surely  allow this possibility. 
In  line with this intuition, suppose that the  mutation rate in  states i*, 
i* + 1,...,N  is  e, while the mutation rate in states 0,1,...,i*  -  1 is  a  for 
some positive constant a.  The interesting case is where e a  < e  or  a>  1, 
although  we do not impose this yet. Except  for this change,  we maintain  all the 
assumptions  from above. It is not difficult  to show that the unique invariant 
distribution, say q', satisfies 
q?  ,-*fXi  kl[l  +fl(s)] 
qN  k2[1  +f2(  e)] 
where fi  and f2  go to zero as e  0. Also, q -0  as e-0  for all i # 0  or N. 
Clearly, if  a > (N  -  i  * + 1)/i*  at*, then the exponent is negative, so this ratio 
goes  to  oo. Hence  q'  -*  1.  If  a <  a*,  then  q  l  -*  1.  Finally,  if  a =  a*,  then 
qOlqN 
-  kl/k2  as e and g go to zero.7  One can show  that a* converges  to 3/2 
as  N  ?o. Hence  for  N  large,  setting  a >  3/2  reverses  the  KMR/Young 
prediction. 
To understand  these results,  consider  the process  without  mutations.  Regard- 
less of where the system starts, it will ultimately converge to either state 0 
forever or  state  N  forever. The  key to  the  KMR/Young  analysis is  the 
comparison  between the basin of attraction  for state 0-that  is, the set of states 
7If we took the mutation  rate in the lower states to be  3s  a,  we could vary 18  to trace out all 
possible  probabilities  over states 0 and N. 948  J.  BERGIN  AND  B.  L.  LIPMAN 
from which the system must ultimately  converge to state 0-and  the basin of 
attraction  for state N. It is easy to see that the basin of attraction  for state 0 
consists  of the states from 0 up to iP -  1, while the basin of attraction  for state 
N contains the remaining  states. It is not hard to show that iP < N/2,  so the 
latter basin contains  more than half the states. 
When mutation  rates are small  but nonzero,  the system  will spend most of its 
time in either state 0 or state N. For concreteness,  suppose  the system  begins in 
state 0. It will stay there until mutations shift the system into the basin of 
attraction  for state N. Then the system  will drift  to state N where it will remain 
until mutations  shift it over to the basin of attraction  for state 0. Consider  the 
case where the mutation  rates are the same in every  state. Because the basin of 
attraction  for state N is larger  than that for state 0, the system  will shift out of 
state 0 more quickly  than it shifts out of state N. Hence the system  will spend 
most of its time in state N. As the mutation  rate goes to zero, the fraction  of the 
time spent in state N converges  to one. 
When the mutation  rates vary  across states, the size of the relevant  basins of 
attraction  is no longer enough to determine  where the system is most of the 
time. In particular,  even though the basin of attraction  for state 0 is smaller,  it 
may  be "deeper"  in the sense that mutations  out of this basin are less likely.  In 
this case, the system  may  well spend most of its time in state 0 instead of state 
N, reversing  the KMR/Young result. 
Unfortunately,  a general characterization  along these lines is quite difficult. 
The  KMR/Young  approach is  combinatoric, involving the  calculation of 
"minimum  cost" paths from one absorbing  state to another.  As the number  of 
absorbing  states increases,  the approach  rapidly  becomes very  complex.  Instead, 
we take a more general approach  which simplifies  the analysis. 
2.2.  The Model 
Our theorem does not require a detailed specification  of the evolutionary 
process  without  mutations.  We assume  only that it is a finite Markov  process.  As 
in Section 2.1, any system  with finitely  many  agents  each with finite memory  and 
a finite strategy  set can be written as a finite state Markov  process.  The state 
space is S = (1,...,  s} and the transition  matrix  P, where p1j  is the probability  of 
a transition  from state i to state j. We refer to P as the mutationless  process. 
Let A denote the set of probability  distributions  on S. A long-run  prediction 
about the mutationless  process is an invariant  distribution. 
DEFINITION  1: An  invariant distribution of  P  is  a vector q E A such that 
q =qP. 
Note that q is a row vector.  Denote by >J(P) the set of invariant  distributions 
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Intuitively,  if q is our belief about the state of the system  and we learn that a 
period of  time has passed (without learning anything directly about the  state), 
then our updated  beliefs qP will be unchanged  if q is invariant. 
The following  definitions  allow us to characterize  the invariant  distributions. 
DEFINITION  2: A subset C of S is absorbing  in P if for all i  E C, j ?  C, pij = 0. 
C is a minimal absorbing  set of P  if it is absorbing in  P  and no subset of it is. 
DEFINITION  3: A state i E S  is  transient in P  if it is not contained in any 
minimal  absorbing  set of P. 
It is easy to see that a state i E S is transient  if there is a j such that pij > 0 
but j is either transient  or in an absorbing  set which does not include i. 
A well-known  fact about Markov  processes' is the following. 
FACT:  There are numbers Ai for each nontransient  state i such that q E A is an 
invariant  distribution  of P if and only if (a) q, = 0 for every  transient  state  j and (b) 
for every minimal absorbing  set C, either qj = 0 for all j E  C or qi/E  fE  c qj =i. 
In other words, all probability  is concentrated  on the nontransient  states. 
Furthermore,  given any invariant  distribution,  the restriction  of the distribution 
to  a  minimal  absorbing set,  if  well-defined,  is  unique.  Hence  all  differences 
between invariant  distributions  correspond  to differences  in the relative  proba- 
bilities of different  minimal  absorbing  sets. 
Most mutationless  evolutionary  dynamics  in the literature  have the property 
that every  strict  Nash equilibrium  corresponds  to a minimal  absorbing  set, as in 
the example in Section 2.1. By the Fact, we see that for any game with more 
than one strict Nash equilibrium,  these dynamics  have more than one minimal 
absorbing set and hence  have infinitely many invariant distributions. 
The Fact also implies that if the only minimal absorbing set is S, then there is 
a unique invariant  distribution.  In this case, P is said to be irreducible.  When P 
is irreducible, the empirical frequency distribution over states converges to the 
unique invariant  distribution  with probability  1 from any initial  condition.  While 
the mutationless  processes considered  in the literature are typically  not irre- 
ducible, the processes generated by adding  mutations  are. This effect is quite 
intuitive:  adding  mutations  makes it possible for the system  to eventually  move 
from any one state to any other. 
We call a procedure  for determining  transition  probabilities  from mutation 
rates a "model of mutations." We emphasize that a model of mutations simply 
describes  how mutations  affect evolution,  not why mutations  occur.  Rather  than 
adopt a specific model of how the addition  of mutations  affects evolution,  we 
prove our theorem for any model of mutations.  In other words, the model of 
8 See, e.g., Iosifescu (1980) for proof. 950  J.  BERGIN  AND  B.  L.  LIPMAN 
mutations  is held fixed,  just as the mutationless  process  is-the  only  variable  we 
use in approximating  a particular  long-run  prediction  is the vector of mutation 
rates. 
Our theorem will cover any model of  mutations satisfying a  few simple 
properties.  First, the process with mutations  must be irreducible.  Second, the 
process with mutations converges smoothly to  the  mutationless process as 
mutation rates go to zero. Third, the mutation  rates may be state dependent 
with only the probability  of  a mutation in state i  relevant for determining 
movements  out of state i via mutation. 
To understand  the motivation  for the third condition,  consider the process 
with mutation  and suppose the current  state is i. How are the probabilities  of. 
transition  to other states determined?  By assumption,  the state summarizes  all 
relevant aspects of the system-the  information  the players have, the payoffs 
they receive, etc. For this reason, if a player does not mutate, his behavior  is 
completely determined by the state. Similarly,  if  a player does mutate, his 
behavior  conditional  on this event is completely  determined  by the state. Finally, 
it is the state i mutation  rate which  determines  the relative  probabilities  of these 
two events. Hence no mutation rate other than the state i  mutation rate is 
relevant for transitions  from state i. Technically,  this is not necessary  for the 
result-transition  probabilities  out of one state can depend on the mutation 
rates for other states. However,  the interpretation  of mutation  rates is less clear 
in this case. See Remark  2. 
Let  Xr denote the  set  of  Markov matrices on  S.  We will call a vector 
8=  (  e1,***, E)  with  ei E [0,1] for all i a vector of  mutation rates. 
DEFINITION  4: A  model  of  mutations  for P  is  a  continuous function M: 
[0,  l]l  s  such that (a) M(0) = P, (b) M(e)  is irreducible  for all 8 >> 0, and (c) 
the elements  of the  ith row of  M(e)  depend only on  ei. 
These three assumptions  have KMR and Young as special  cases, as well as all 
the other models we are aware  of in this literature. 
To determine  the importance  of restrictions  on mutation  rates,  we character- 
ize the set of predictions  one can generate with arbitrary  small mutation  rates 
given some fixed  model of mutations.  This motivates  the following  definition. 
DEFINITION  5: A probability  distribution  q E A is achievable  with mutation 
model M if there exists a sequence of strictly  positive mutation rate vectors 
8?  -*0  such that  qn -  q where {qf} =  A(M(en)).  Let  Vf(M) denote  the set of 
achievable  distributions  with mutation  model M. 
Intuitively,  an achievable  distribution  is a q solving q =  qP which is "robust" 
in the sense that we can find a sequence  {Mk}  of irreducible  transition  matrices 
converging  to P  such that the sequence of distributions  {qk}  uniquely  solving 
qk =qkMk  converges to  q. An important  point to note is that the mutation 
model acts as a constraint  on our-choice  of {Mk} in that we require  each Mk  to EVOLUTION  WITH  MUTATIONS  951 
equal M(8k)  for some  ek  >> O,  where  8k  ->  0. Proving our theorem without this 
restriction is very straightforward. 
KMR and Young  require  ei  to be  independent  of  i.  Hence  they, in effect, 
consider only a single sequence  of  e  vectors. We do not impose this restriction 
and so have many sequences. 
REMARK  1: The reader may find an analogy useful. When defining trembling- 
hand perfect  equilibria, one  first calculates  e-perfect  equilibria where  agents 
may make mistakes. One then considers the limit as these mistake probabilities 
go to zero. Any sequence  of mistake probabilities converging to zero is allowed. 
An  e-perfect equilibrium is analogous to an invariant distribution with mutation 
rate vector  8  and an achievable distribution is analogous to a perfect  equilib- 
rium. As with perfection,  we  allow for any sequence  of  mutation rate vectors 
going to zero. 
3.  THE  MAIN  RESULT 
Our main result  is  that with  state-dependent  mutation  rates,  any invariant 
distribution of the mutationless process is achievable with any mutation model. 
THEOREM  1:  If M is any mutation model for P,  then  i(M)  = >J(P). 
To understand the proof intuitively, suppose that P  is the identity matrix, so 
.J(P)  = A. Note  that  any mutation  model  M  defines  a  correspondence  from 
vectors  of  mutation  rates  to  A giving the  set  of  invariant distributions as- a 
function of the mutation rates. Given any q >  0, we can analyze this function for 
the set of  8  vectors summing to  qj. Given this restriction, we can "rescale" the 
mutation rates by  q so that they add to  1, changing this to  a correspondence 
from  A to itself. Call this correspondence  G.  and a typical "rescaled" mutation 
rate vector x. We show that G.  is onto-that  is, for every q E A, there is an x 
such that q =  GW(x).  Hence we can find a vector of mutation rates, summing to 
as  small  a  number  as  desired,  which  generate  q  as  the  unique  invariant 
distribution. 
An  important  point  is  that  we  use  very  little  information  about  how  G 
behaves  on  the  interior. This is  a necessary  aspect  of  the  proof because  it is 
difficult to characterize how the invariant distribution varies with  e  for e >> 0. 
PROOF OF THEOREM  1: Let  A  denote  the interior of  A (the  set of distribu- 
tions with strictly positive probability on all points) and dA the boundary (the set 
of  distributions with at least  one  state  given zero probability). Lemma  1 gives 
sufficient conditions for a correspondence to be onto. 
LEMMA  1:  If G: A --,A  is an upper  semicontinuous correspondence  which maps 
dA to itself, is single-valued on  A  and convex-valued on  dA, and has no fixed 
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PROOF:  Suppose G( A) # A. Clearly,  since G is upper semicontinous,  G( A) is 
closed. Hence A\ G( A) is open. Choose any element, say b, from  the interior  of 
this set. 
Define a function Pb: G(A) -> dA as follows. Given any x E G(A),  draw a 
straight  line from b through  x to the boundary  and let Pb(X)  be the point  where 
this line intersects  the boundary.  Clearly,  Pb is a continuous  function  on G( A). 
Note also that for any x e  dA, Pb(X)  = x. 
Define  a correspondence  Gb: A -*  A by  Gb(x)  =  Pb(G(x)).  Since  G  is upper 
semicontinuous  and  Pb  is continuous, Gb  is upper semicontinuous  as well. 
Furthermore,  since G is single-valued  on  A', Gb  is as well. For any x E dA, 
G(x) c dA.  Hence Gb(x)  = G(x) for any x e  dA.  Since G(x) must  be convex,  we 
see that Gb is convex-valued. 
By the  Kakutani fixed point theorem, then, there is  some x*  such that 
x* E Gb(x*).  Since Pb  maps to the boundary  of the simplex, we must have 
Gb(x*)  C dA, so  x* E dA. But  as just  argued, for  any  x E dA, Gb(x)  =  G(x). 
Hence x* E dA and x* E G(x*). But by hypothesis,  G has no fixed  point on the 
boundary. Hence  G( A) = A.  Q.E.D. 
To complete  the proof,  we focus first  on the case where all minimal  absorbing 
sets are singletons.  At the end of the proof, we explain the extension to the 
general  case. We prove  the theorem  by constructing  a particular  correspondence 
which satisfies  the conditions  of Lemma 1. 
Let Nc  S denote the absorbing  states of  P  and let  T =  S \N.  For conve- 
nience, we  often write  8=  (eN,  eT).  Let  AN denote the  set  of  probability 
distributions  on  N.  Also, let  AN denote the  interior of  AN and  dAN its 
boundary.  Fix any mutation  model M. Given any  ?  >>  0, let I(e)  E A denote the 
unique invariant  distribution  for the process M(e). 
Lemma 2 will be used to establish upper semicontinuity  of the correspon- 
dence we will construct  shortly. 
LEMMA  2: If ek  -  *,  8k  >> 0 for all k, then for every convergent  subsequence 
{I(ekj)}  of {I(ek)}, 
iim If  skj)  E >_,(M(  8*)). 
J _) 00 
Therefore, W(M) c>(P). 
PROOF:  Let  q k = I(ek  ) and Mk = M(.e k). Without loss of generality, suppose 
qk q.  Because  M  is continuous,  Mk  M(e*)  (entry by entry). By definition, 
qkMk  =  qk,  so  passing to the limit, qM(8*)  = q  or 
lim  I(8k)  c_Y(M(8*)).  Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 3 will be used to show that the correspondence we will construct will 
satisfy the boundary properties required in Lemma 1. 
LEMMA  3:  If  se = O for some i E N and  el > O for all I E T, then for all j with 
ei>  0and  all q e-_(M(e)),  we have qj=  0. 
PROOF:  Suppose  that  si =0  for  some  i e N  and  61 > 0  for  all  1 E T.  By 
assumption, the  jth  row of  M(e)  depends  only on  ej. Since  M(O)  =  P,  ei =0 
implies that the ith row of  M(e)  is identical to the ith row of P. Because  i E N, 
this row must contain a 1 in the  ith place and 0's elsewhere. Therefore,  i must 
be an absorbing state of  M(e).  Consider any j  with ej > 0. Fix any  8*  >> 0 such 
that  e* = el  for  all  1 with  e, > 0.  By  our  assumptions  on  mutation  models, 
M(e*)  is irreducible, so the probability of transiting from state j  to state i in a 
finite  number  of  periods  is  strictly positive  in  M(e*).  If  every  state  in  this 
sequence  has  a strictly positive  mutation rate in  8,  then  M(e)  still gives this 
sequence  of  states  strictly positive probability since  the  relevant rows must be 
the  same  as the  corresponding rows of  M(e*).  In this event, state  j  must be 
transient in M(e).  If some state in this sequence has a zero mutation rate, then, 
since it must also be in N  by hypothesis, it, too, is absorbing, again establishing 
that state j  is transient in  M(e).  Hence,  for any q e- _(M(e)),  Fact 1 implies 
that qj = 0.  Q.E.D. 
We are now ready to construct the key correspondence. Define  a: A -4  AN by 
1 
ai(q) = qi+#T  E  qj 
#T]e  T 
Next, for any q > 0  and  8T  >> 0, we construct a correspondence  G,  ST: 'AN  -4  AN 
by 
G  'l,ST(x) =  aC(9(M(r7x,  8T)).) 
For notational simplicity, we often omit the 'q,  8T  subscripts. In other words, fix 
the mutation rates for the transient states at  8T  and fix the total of the mutation 
rates for the nontransient states  at  'q. Given a vector x  in  AN, we construct a 
vector of mutation rates by "rescaling" x by 'q  and then adding to the vector the 
mutation rates for the transient states. We then use this to calculate the set of 
invariant distributions associated with these mutation rates. Finally, we use  a  to 
convert these  distributions to probability distributions on  N.  For convenience, 
we occasionally write _>(x)  for >9(M(Gx, 8T)),  so that G(x)  = a(G(x)). 
It is not  hard to  show that  G  satisfies the  requirements of  Lemma  1. It is 
single-valued on the  interior because  (7qx,  8T)  >> 0 when  x >> 0. Lemma 2 and 
the continuity of  a  imply that G is upper semicontinuous. 
To characterize G at some x E dAN,  note that there must be some i E N  with 
xi = 0. Hence by Lemma 3, for every j E T and every j with xj > 0, we must have 954  J.  BERGIN  AND  B.  L.  LIPMAN 
qj = 0 for all q EC>(x).  But then for i E N  and q EC>(x), 
ai(q) = qi +  *E  qj = qi. 
jeT  j E- T 
That is, for q EC>(x),  a(q)  is simply the identity mapping projecting q onto  N, 
since  q  is zero off  N.  Because  the  set of  invariant distributions for any given 
transition matrix is convex, this means that G is convex-valued on the boundary. 
Furthermore, fix any j  such  that  xj >  0. Lemma 3  implies  that  qj = 0  and so 
aj(q)  =  0 for all  q e->(x).  Hence  G  maps the  boundary to the  boundary and 
has no fixed points on the boundary. Therefore, by Lemma 1, G is surjective. 
To  complete  the  proof  of  the  Theorem,  note  that  the  assumption that  all 
minimal absorbing sets are singletons implies that 
9(P)  =  {q E a I  qi = 0, Vi E T}  . 
Clearly, then,  Y(P)  can be viewed  as one-to-one  with  AN.  We  first focus  on 
strictly positive distributions, so fix any q Ec  AN. 
Since  G maps the boundary of  AN to the boundary, surjectivity implies that 
Gn, T(A  j)  = AN for every q  > 0 and  ST  >>  0. Fix any sequences  qk and  ET going 
to  zero  from  above.  Clearly for  each  k,  there  is  an  xk >> 0  such  that  {q} = 
G-,k  k(Xk)  =  a(I(qkXk,  e)).  For i E N, let e6k  =  rkxk.  Then 
qi =  lim  ai(I(ek))  =  lim  j1(8k)  +  _  E  L(k)  =  lim  Ii(8k) 
k--oo  k--oo  #T  jET  k--oo 
where the last equality follows from  e8k-+  0. Hence  any q E AN  is achievable. 
Therefore, the interior of _J(P)  is contained in  W(M). It is easy to see from 
the  definition  of  W(M)  that  it  must  be  closed.  Hence  this  establishes  that 
_J(P)  C v(M).  Since the converse  was established  by Lemma  2, this shows that 
the two sets are equal. 
To  see  how  to  handle  the  case  where  the  minimal absorbing sets  are  not 
singletons,  recall  from  Fact  1  that  the  invariant  distributions  within  each 
minimal absorbing set are uniquely defined. Hence we only need to ensure that 
we  can  achieve  any  distribution  across  minimal  absorbing  sets.  To  do  so, 
redefine N above to be the collection of minimal  absorbing  sets instead of the 
set of  absorbing states  and replace  S  with  S* = N U T. We can then focus on 
mutation  rates with the  property that for any two states  i  and j  in the  same 
minimal  absorbing  set of P, ei = ej. Instead  of generating  invariant  distributions 
on S, we can focus only on the induced distributions  on S*. It is not hard to 
rewrite  Lemma 3 and the construction  of G to conclude that any distribution 
across  minimal  absorbing  sets is achievable,  so that any invariant  distribution  of 
P is achievable.  Q.E.D. 
In  short,  with  no  restrictions  on  how  mutation  rates  vary  across  states, 
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mutations does not seem justifiable. We have argued that without a model, there 
is  no  obvious  reason  to  impose  any particular constraints on  mutation  rates, 
including the constraint that mutation rates all go to zero at the same rate. 
Different  rates  of  convergence  are  important  to  the  result.  To  see  why, 
suppose that we follow KMR/Young  in assuming that the mutation model M is 
polynomial in the mutation rates. More precisely, the transition probability from 
state i to state j given mutation rate vector e  is some polynomial in ei. Suppose 
we impose the restriction that the mutation rates go to zero at the same rate in 
the  simplest  possible  way  by  requiring  the  mutation  rates  to  be  constant 
multiples of one another-that  is, that  ei = ai 6 for some constant ai > 0 where 
6 converges to zero. It is not hard to show that the "resistances" computed by 
KMR/Young  in  their  analysis  of  the  limiting  behavior  of  the  system  are 
independent of the ai's. Hence  the support of the limiting invariant distribution 
as  6 goes to zero must be independent of the ai's. (This is essentially the proof 
Samuelson (1994) gives for his Theorem 4.) 
This fact can be interpreted in a variety of ways. On the one hand, one might 
argue that the mutation rates should all go to zero at the same rate and that the 
polynomial  restriction  is  not  unreasonable.  If  so,  one  would  conclude  that 
the KMR/Young  technique is quite robust. On the other hand, as noted in the 
introduction, there are many possible views on the "reasonableness" of various 
assumptions on mutation rates, none of which seem to have any priority over the 
others in the  absence  of  a concrete  model  describing what mutations are and 
why they occur. For example, it seems  quite natural to adapt Myerson's (1978) 
argument to  conclude  that more  costly "experimentation errors" should have 
probabilities going to zero more quickly. 
Also, Blume (1995) finds a similar multiplicity of long-run outcomes when the 
mutation rate for a state is quickly decreasing in the number of times the system 
has visited that state. Intuitively, if the system stays in one state for a long time, 
we would expect very little further experimentation while there, so that state's 
mutation rate would be very low. Hence  the states that get visited often in the 
early periods may have  much smaller mutation  rates from then  on.  This will 
have an effect very similar to what we get by computing invariant distributions 
for  a fixed vector  of  mutation  rates  and then  taking these  rates to  zero with 
some mutation rates going to zero more quickly than others. 
REMARK 2:  Our assumptions on mutation models can be substantially relaxed 
with minor changes in the proof of Theorem  1. First, the assumption that M(e) 
is irreducible for  all  e >> 0 can be weakened  to  requiring only that for every 
>> 0,  M(8)  has  a unique  minimal absorbing set  containing  all nontransient 
states. Second and more importantly, our assumption that the ith row of  M(8) 
only depends on  ei can be relaxed to the following less intuitive requirement: If 
A, B c S are disjoint, absorbing sets in P, then 
(i)  ei = 0,  Vi EA  =A  is absorbing in M(e),  and 
(ii)  8i>0,  ViEAUT  and  ei=0,  ViEB=*i  is transient  in  M(e),  ViEA, 956  J.  BERGIN  AND  B.  L.  LIPMAN 
where  T  is the  set of transient states of  P.  This condition  essentially assumes 
the result of Lemma 3. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that if mutation rates can vary in any fashion with the state, 
then,  regardless  of  what  one  assumes  about  how  mutation  affects  evolution, 
adding small mutation probabilities does  not refine the set of long-run predic- 
tions at all. In this sense,  it is only restrictions on the mutation rates that can 
allow mutation to  refine predictions. One  could interpret this result as saying 
that  it  is  futile  to  try  to  refine  the  set  of  long-run  predictions  by  adding 
mutation.  An  alternative  interpretation  is  that  the  nature  of  the  mutation 
process must be analyzed more carefully to derive some economically justifiable 
restrictions. Blume (1995) provides some  ideas along these  lines. It is an open 
question whether and what kinds of interesting restrictions will emerge. 
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